Don't be a Perdurantist

Many people take issue, for various reasons, with the claim that the universe had a beginning. Some people believe that the science doesn't support that assertion. Others, I would argue most, who try to find some way around the universe's beginning are trying to avoid there being a personal cause of the universe because that points to the existence of God. William Lane Craig has been the foremost defender and expositor of the Kalam Cosmological Argument, which uses the beginning of the universe as a premise in a philosophical argument for God's existence, and I have written an extensive post about that argument here if you are unfamiliar with it.
One of the main contentions of opponents of this argument is that of the B-theory of time, also called the static conception of time. The B-theory of time suggests that moments of time are tenseless and exist equally. The "Back to the Future" movies would be a good way to think of this theory. Marty McFly goes back to 1955 in the first movie and the citizens of Hill Valley are going about their business: running into manure trucks and preparing for the Enchantment Under the Sea Dance. Eventually, he makes it back to 1985 and things are continuing on as if nothing happened. This seems to presuppose a B-theory of time in which every moment of time is equally real. On this view, it would be nonsensical to say that anything begins to exist. If every moment of time is equally real all the time, nothing comes into being, it just is. The implication of this is that the universe doesn't really begin to exist, because the "Big Bang" is always ongoing. If we could travel through time with Doc Brown, we could see the "Big Bang" as it is happening.
The point of this post is not to wrangle with those who argue about the beginning of the universe and thus God's existence, but to present a serious problem to believers who hold to the B-theory of time. Does this mean that I think those Christians who hold to a B-theory cannot believe in God and thus, are not Christians? NO! That is not what I mean. My intention is to convince Christians that hold this view that it is very problematic for one very troubling reason: perdurantism.
In order to understand what perdurantism is, we have to look at what is known as the problem of intrinsic change that the B-theorist encounters. The problem of intrinsic change "is how something can remain self-identical if it has different properties at different times" (1). This basically means how can a person, F. F. Bruce for instance, be F. F. Bruce moment to moment if every moment produces a change in him. A change means an object is taking on or jettisoning properties. B-theorists have posited that people are just 4-dimensional objects (the 4th dimension is time) that appear to us as 3-dimensional objects. So, B-theorists answer that indeed, F. F. Bruce is not the same moment to moment, but simply a part of the 4-dimensional object "F. F. Bruce", which philosophers call "hyper-objects" that are extended in both time and space. Since the person we see as F. F. Bruce is but a part of the 4-dimensional object "F. F. Bruce", it follows that the F. F. Bruce from 20 years ago is a different part and thus, not identical to the present (to us) F. F. Bruce. In a nutshell, people are not the same self-identifying beings from moment to moment. Philosophers of time who hold this view merely say that objects perdure. So perdurantism is the view that ordinary things like animals, boats and planets have temporal parts (things persist by ‘perduring’) (2). The following is my summary of 3 reasons why perdurantism is false from William Lane Craig (3) followed by some other comments of my own.

1. Perdurantism's account of intrinsic change is implausible.
Since, on perdurantism, an object is a composition of spatio-temporal parts that make up a "hyper-object" in 4 dimensions, none of these parts are identical. But, if none of the parts are identical as the perdurantist admits, then nothing, including the parts or the "hyper-object" actually undergoes any intrinsic change. It is not correct to say that F. F. Bruce from 20 years ago gained wisdom and now has the property of being wise in our time because "present F. F. Bruce" and "F. F. Bruce from twenty years ago" are entirely different 3-dimensional objects that are parts of the hyper-object "F. F. Bruce". The parts merely have different properties that they neither gain nor lose. Thus, there is no intrinsic change going on, it is an illusion of philosophical theory.

2. Perdurantism flies in the face of the phenomenology of personal consciousness.
We know ourselves to be persons. This concept is known as self-consciousness. Perdurantists view people as spatio-temporal parts of hyper-objects with no self-consciousness. This means that these parts are not actually persons, just parts that do not have any of the properties normally associated with personhood. No intellect, emotions, will, moral responsibility, etc. Some perdurantists say that the 3-dimensional objects really are persons and the corresponding 4-dimensional object is a hyper-person, but this doesn't work either. This would mean that the hyper-person is comprised of a number of individual persons having, for instance, their own memories that are not shared by each individual part. So, it isn't really you having that memory of your wedding, it is a distinct, non-identical 3-dimensional part of the 4-dimensional "hyper-you-person". This seems absurd on many levels. Does anyone really think that they are not the same person second to second and that they are recalling someone else's wedding memory while walking down memory lane?

3. Perdurantism is incompatible with moral responsibility, praise, and blame.
Even if we grant that the 3-dimensional objects that are parts of the 4-dimensional hyper-person are persons as well, there is a problem. Since they are all distinct persons, how can a criminal spend his life in jail considering that even 5 minutes later he is not the same person? He can't be held accountable for the crime of "5 minutes ago criminal". If we back up to the initial perdurantist view that these parts are just that, parts not persons, this is even more absurd than our criminal above. How can a part of a 4-dimensional hyper-object be held responsible for good or bad actions? The answer is they cannot.

The balance of probability lies in favor of saying that perdurantism is false. Now, the B-theorist may try to use the opposite theory concerning the problem of intrinsic change. That of endurantism, which says that objects endure and are the same object moment to moment. But, the B-theorist really has no recourse to use this theory because they hold that one moment of time is equally real to another. This means that there are at least two identical objects that have different properties. This cannot be however, because for objects to be identical, they must have the same properties. The endurantist would appeal to the A-theory of time that sees only the present moment as real. Hence only one object, the person F. F. Bruce to use our earlier example, exists. If you subscribe to the B-theory of time, it looks like you are stuck with perdurantism and thinking that persons are not really persons.
Finally, what is to me the most serious matter regarding perdurantism and the B-theory of time is that of the cross of Christ. Hebrews 10:10 says: "And by that will we have been sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all." If the Christ hanging on the cross is: i) not a person or ii) not the same person who submitted to the will of the Father in the garden of Gethsemane; how can it be rightly said that he atoned for our sin and reconciled us to God? It doesn't seem to me that this can be said if you hold to perdurantism. Likewise, if the B-theory of time is true, Christ forever hangs on the cross, forever offering payment to the Father for our sins that we are committing forever. "Once for all" just doesn't make any sense on the perdurantism/B-theory of time view. And if you hold to the B-theory of time, then you are stuck with perdurantism. So, don't be a perdurantist!

References
1. William Lane Craig. Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time. Crossway Books, Wheaton, Illinois. 2001. Page 200.
2. Temporal Parts (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
3. William Lane Craig. Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time. Crossway Books, Wheaton, Illinois. 2001. Page 203-6.